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Abstract. We argue that current funding campaigns to fight AIDS in developing countries fail 
to recognize significant losses associated with the introduction of innovative treatment 
technologies. For instance, the future albeit uncertain appearance and widespread use of a 
therapeutic vaccine will trigger significant and unrecoverable losses in current drugs treatment 
investments. Our objective is then two-fold. We first document losses associated with the 
transition to better treatment technologies and we show that failure to hedge against such 
losses leads to sub-optimal policies. Our second objective is to provide policy 
recommendations to alleviate this problem. We show how to transform some cutting-hedge 
financial products to generate full insurance coverage against such losses, and in some cases 
how to achieve full risk-sharing with agencies developing innovative treatments. We 
recommend that every funding campaign in current AIDS treatments be accompanied with the 





The epidemic of HIV/AIDS has been one of the most significant medical 
crises worldwide in the last few decades. It turns out that the epidemic has 
mostly spread in developing countries, for instance in Sub-Saharan Africa where 
the share of HIV infected individuals represents 5% of the population in 2007 
(see UNAIDS 2007). Given the magnitude of the epidemic, both governmental 
and international interventions are necessary to contain and eradicate the disease. 
The shocking consequence is that developing countries face not only a medical 
crisis, but also an economic crisis since a significant fraction of national GDP 
must be allocated to fighting the disease. For instance, Nigeria has allocated 
1.2% of its GDP in 2005 to fight HIV/AIDS only (see Hickey 2005), a colossal 
amount of national resources that no country can forfeit without severe 
consequences on its economic development. Moreover, the spread of the disease 
triggers an increase in AIDS-related spendings over time; for instance, the 
percentage of health expenditures devoted to HIV/AIDS has switched from 
0.8% to 7.8% between 2001 and 2005 in South-Africa (see Hickey 2005). 
 
International agencies such as the United Nations, the GAFTAM and the G7 
have provided significant subsidies and expertise to developing countries to help 
them contain and eradicate the disease. A total of about US$ 8.3 billion have 
been spent in 2005, about US$ 8.9 billion and US$ 10 billion in 2006 and 2007 
respectively (see Leoni and Luchini, 2006). Nevertheless, those subsidies are 
nowhere close to being sufficient to meet the medical needs, and a significant 
part of the economic burden still remains on the developing countries.  
 
In the situation of insufficient resources that developing countries face, the 
need to prioritize medical interventions and to identify optimal economic 
policies to fund them becomes critical. So far, economic policies have focused 
on two distinct objectives. The first objective is to foster investments in current 
treatment technologies such as field delivery of already-available ARV 
treatments; the second one is to allocate funds, entirely coming from developed 
countries, to develop innovative treatment technologies such as therapeutic 
vaccines (see Klausner et al., 2003). 
 
In this study, we argue that those two policies are antagonistic, and thus 
inefficient, because they fail to address the severe inefficiencies associated with 
the transition to future albeit uncertain innovative treatment technologies. In a 
first step, we show that the development of innovative treatment technologies is 
a deterrent to current investments in available technologies. The basic idea is 
that the optimal reaction of developing countries, when facing the risk of 
forfeiting a significant part of current investments during the transition, is to 
postpone those investments until more information becomes available about the 
time of their obsolescence. This finding is consistent with reports of reluctance 
to invest in current treatment technologies in some African countries (see 
UNAIDS, 2004, p.11). Second, we show that the availability of insurance 
contracts allowing developing countries to hedge against the severe losses 
resulting from the appearance of an innovative treatment (a therapeutic vaccine 
for instance) must be a full component of every optimal policy in the fight 
against HIV/AIDS. We also explain why standard insurance contracts cannot be 
used for this type of risk, and we describe two distinct ways of efficiently 
replicating the desired hedge using recent financial products such as exotic 
options. 
 
The deterrence to invest in current treatment technologies is briefly explained 
as follows. As documented in Section 2, therapeutic vaccines currently 
developed are more effective both at medical and economic levels. It is 
commonly agreed that the therapeutic vaccine will eventually become available, 
although the time of availability is uncertain. Current treatment technologies 
such as ARV treatments would then become immediately obsolete after the 
appearance of such vaccines. Moreover, new financial efforts would be needed 
to implement the innovative technology. The abandonment of the obsolete 
technology nevertheless implies to forfeit unrecoverable previous investments; 
those losses are particularly severe and are documented in Section 3. The social 
cost of those losses triggers severe crowding-out effects on every other public 
expenditures; that is, those unrecoverable AIDS-rel
decrease public investments in other essential activities of a country life such as 
schools, roads et.c. (see Harling et al., 2005). It turns out that an insurance 
contract available at the time decisions to invest in current treatments are made, 
and allowing to hedge against the losses resulting from the upgrading, is the 
most efficient way to alleviate those crowding-out effects. 
 
  When the development of innovative technologies is accompanied by the 
issuance of hedging schemes as described in this study, we argue that optimal 
delays in current investments are shortened. The main benefit of shortening 
those optimal delays is an easier containment of the epidemic, with positive 
consequences on the morbidity as well as future economic development. Despite 
the availability of insurance schemes and its influences on current investments, 
it remains optimal to nevertheless delay because of crowding-out effects linked 
to the always present losses in unrecoverable investments. Another positive 
effect of the introduction of those insurance schemes is the increase in optimal 
provision of current treatments, as argued in the welfare analysis of Leoni and 
Luchini (2006). 
 
In Section 5, we discuss in details why standard insurance contracts are of no 
help to generate the desired hedge. Basically, the nature of the risk does not 
allow the issuer to diversify away as it is typically done. This fact alone prevents 
the issuance of such contracts because of the large amount of money at stake. 
However, we show how to modify recently commercialised financial products to 
replicate the desired hedge. We give two distinct methods hinging on different 
approaches of diversification. The first approach is derived from so-called 
Collaterized Debt Obligations, initially used to hedge the risk of losses on 
corporate bonds (see Chacko et al. 2006). The second approach uses a set of 
appropriately designed securities to be purchased both by developing countries 
and agencies in charge of vaccines R&D. Leoni and Luchini (2006) shows that 
full risk-sharing between developing countries and R&D agencies can be 
achieved when those securities are traded. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we carry out a general 
economic analysis, presenting all the relevant data relevant and explaining the 
improvements a therapeutic vaccine brings upon the currently available 
technologies. In Section 3, we explain why it always remains optimal to 
postpone current investments. In Section 4, we carry out a standard risk 
management analysis to show the improvements an insurance contract against a 
vaccine appearance before a given date brings. In Section 5, we give two distinct 
ways to generate the desired hedge using exotic options. Finally, Section 6 
concludes this work. We have kept our discussion at a conceptual level, always 
presenting the intuition of the results and purposely avoiding mathematical 
modelling. The interested reader is invited to check the mathematical soundness 
of our results by directly looking at the references therein. Moreover, our 
analysis is devoted to the important case of HIV/AIDS, although the same 
analysis extends to similar diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria.  
 
2. General economic analysis 
 
We now discuss two important economic ideas central to the problem of 
transition to innovative treatment technologies. Those two ideas are crowding-
out effects triggered by AIDS-related expenditures, and economic externalities 
(or future consequences) associated with the spread of the disease. In a first step, 
we identify why optimal economic policies must prioritize those problems; in 
subsequent sections we will discuss why the issuance of appropriate insurance 
schemes must be part of every optimal policy tackling those problems. Even if 
our focus is on AIDS, our discussion extends to similar diseases such as malaria 
and tuberculosis. 
 
The first and obvious economic issue in the fight against HIV/AIDS is the 
funding of current treatments; that is, once an infected population and 
appropriate treatments strategies are identified the most natural challenge is to 
optimally allocate funds to implement those strategies (see Jenkins and Robalino, 
2003, for an exhaustive list of strategies). This problem is simple albeit already 
difficult to address, since funds are not available to fully tackle this problem. For 
instance, the total amount of funds to fight AIDS in 2004 amounted to U.S. 
$10.8 billion, which resulted only in 12% of the overall HIV-positive population 
worldwide receiving ARV treatments (see WHO, 2004, this figure includes 
international subsidies). Moreover, even if governments in developing countries 
were to allocate enough funds to treat the infected population in its entirety, the 
diversion of those funds from other necessary public expenditures (such as 
schools, public infrastructures and else, see Harling et al., 2003) would render 
this policy inefficient. The idea is that, when treating the whole infected 
population, the severe reduction in social welfare resulting from all the other 
forfeited expenditures would offset the benefits of eradicating the disease. The 
economic situation is thus far more complex than solely funding treatment 
strategies on a given infected population, and addressing this issue alone without 
alleviating crowding-out effects necessarily leads to sub-optimal policies. 
 
Another important issue is the future economic consequences of the spread of 
the epidemic. The most natural consequence of an uncontrolled spread is an 
increase in future public expenditures that will aggravate crowding-out effects 
(see Hickey, 2005, for the already-described increase in public expenditures in 
South-Africa). We next argue that an uncontrolled spread of the epidemic also, 
and perhaps foremost, leads to a decrease in domestic investments and in turn to 
a slow-down in the economic growth of developing countries. When a 
significant fraction of the population is infected as in Sub-Saharan countries, it 
becomes difficult to maintain a productive labour force and in turn competitive 
businesses because of the morbidity associated with AIDS. The prospect that the 
epidemic spreads, and thus that a larger fraction of the labour force gets infected, 
makes current investment decisions in labor-intensive businesses riskier and 
thus less likely. Labour-intensive businesses that are typical in developing 
countries may indeed find themselves short of workers in the long-run, and thus 
they may have to slow-down their production plans with a long-term reduction 
in profitability.  
 
When making investment decisions in labour-intensive businesses, or in 
other words when evaluating the profitability of such investments, it becomes 
essential to anticipate the spread of the epidemic and its effect on the labour 
force. Standard economic theory (Dixit and Pyndick, 1994, Chapters 5-11 for 
instance) teaches us that the optimal reaction is to postpone investments until 
better information about the reliability of the labour force becomes available. 
However, postponing the creation and/or expansion of such businesses is a 
significant impediment to the economic development of already poor countries. 
At a micro-economic level, delays in investments affect nearly every aspect of 
economic life, such as agriculture with possible future famines and private 
sectors (see Shisana et al., 2004, for an exhaustive list of economic sectors 
sensitive to AIDS). Young (2007) reaches similar conclusions using a different 
approach, although the author considers mortality as an economic factor. 
Therefore, optimal economic policies must address not only the treatment of the 
currently infected population, but also the containment of the epidemic to reduce 
future negative effects on the labor force. 
 
It turns out that crowding-out effects and spread externalities are intimately 
linked to the problem of transition to innovative treatment technologies, for 
reasons made clear in the next section. In the remainder of this study, we 
develop in details this issue that has been completely ignored so far, and we also 
describe some other negative economic consequences associated with switching 
to innovative treatment technologies. We also provide policy recommendations 
optimally tackling the pitfalls of upgrading; in particular, we show that those 
recommended policies alleviate crowding-out effects and spread externalities.  
 
3. Optimal investment delays   
 
We now explain why it is always optimal to delay current investments when 
facing the risk of upgrading to an innovative treatment technology. The analysis 
developed here for the therapeutic vaccine extends to any other medical 
improvement. 
 
The difficulty with current treatments against HIV/AIDS, such as ARV 
treatments, is that they are awkwardly expensive and difficult to deliver to 
patients. Moreover, much better ways to tackle the epidemic, both at medical 
and economic levels, are being developed and will eventually cause the 
abandonment of current treatments. The best innovative treatment technology 
being currently developed is a therapeutic vaccine, capable of both reducing the 
transmissibility of the virus and treating infected patients by reducing the viral 
load within a population (see Klausner et al., 2003). With such a vaccine 
available, one injection only would treat a patient instead of a live-long 
treatment with ARV; moreover, the cost of production and delivery of one 
injection is small. Even if such vaccines are typically cheap to produce and easy 
to deliver to patients, the development is technologically challenging and 
expensive (see Kremer and Glennester, 2004). We have witnessed many failures 
in the R&D process, for instance with the Institut Pasteur in 2004 and Merck & 
Co. in 2007; however, it is commonly agreed that it is just a matter of time 
before success arises.   
 
The availability of this vaccine could thus appear as good news for 
developing countries, since cheaper and more effective ways to treat large 
infected populations would de facto become available. Developing countries and 
subsidizing organisations such as GAFTAM, the G7 and others will find it 
optimal to adopt this new vaccine technology, both for medical and economic 
reasons. International subsidies amounting to roughly 75% of the overall budget 
allocated to fighting AIDS will thus be diverted to vaccine implementation, 
forcing in turn developing countries to upgrade to this new technology. 
Nevertheless, irreversible investments in current treatments technologies will be 
lost.  
 
Those irreversible investments or sunk-costs are particularly stringent in the 
case of ARV treatments for instance; using UNAIDS 2004 data Leoni and 
Luchini (2006) estimates that, at the very least, they amount to $6 billion for the 
period 2005-2008. This last figure includes program level costs or managerial 
costs and related issues, but it does not include the cost of reshuffling/shutting 
down drugs plants nor inefficiencies linked with the transition period.  This 
amount would represent not only a severe direct loss in case of a switch for 
developing countries, but also and perhaps foremost the opportunity cost1 of 
those funds is severe and renders public economic policies inefficient if those 
losses cannot be compensated.   
 
The general framework is thus as follows. Consider the decision for a 
developing country of whether to invest now in available treatments. Some of 
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 That is, the social value of what is forfeited with those funds. 
those investments are irreversible; that is, once the money is spent it cannot be 
recovered if those treatments are to be abandoned in the future. The risk faced 
by developing countries is about the date of obsolescence of those investments, 
or in others words about when a therapeutic vaccine appears. We next see how 
the uncertainty about the time those losses occur distorts optimal decisions to 
invest now in available treatments technologies.  
 
The following figure summarizes the timing of investment decision in current 
technology and obsolescence of such investments, where the obsolescence 
corresponds to the random appearance of the vaccine for the reasons previously 
explained. 
 
Figure 1 Timing of investment and obsolescence 
 
This abstract situation has been extensively analyzed in economic theory; 
it is a standard risk management problem with countless applications in 
Industrial Organisation and Finance for instance. Following an argument similar 
to that in Dixit and Pyndick (94) Ch. 7 for instance, it can be derived that the 
optimal investment decision in our setting is… to postpone the investment. The 
strategic motivation for delaying the investments is to wait until better 
information about the expected time of a vaccine appearance becomes public; 
this in turn will provide a better estimate about how long current investments 
will remain in place and thus about their profitability.  
 
This idea is rather intuitive and easy to explain. The decision of investing 
now in current treatment technologies is based on the comparison between the 
return of the investments, not entirely measured in monetary terms in our setting, 
and the overall social cost of the investments. It is important to notice that the 
social cost of those investments ought to include the opportunity cost of money; 
that is, the cost of not using this money for other necessary social needs such as 
building schools and roads. The decision to invest now is optimal when the 
expected social benefits exceed the expected social costs, where the expectation 
encompasses the random time of obsolescence of current investments. This 
method is standard in Economics, and it is called a cost-benefit analysis. Since 
the time of appearance is random, it is rational to use the expected time of 
appearance when making the above comparison.  
 
Standard results in Probability Theory show that, when better information 
become available over time, the estimator of the expected appearance time 
becomes more accurate leading in turn to more reliable cost-benefit analysis. 
The optimal delay to invest thus corresponds exactly to the date when this 
estimator on the time of vaccine appearance becomes accurate enough to make 
the cost-benefit analysis reliable. Information about the likely time of a vaccine 
appearance will come naturally over time, for instance through public releases of 
success probability in the trial period of the vaccine or investment levels from 
bodies in charge of its pre-trial R&D.  The situation is illustrated in the 
following figure. 
 
Figure 2. Optimal delay in current investments 
 
We still need to incorporate the externality of the epidemic spread in our 
analysis. The apparent difficulty is that any optimal decision to invest now must 
encompass this issue, and at the same time an investment delay (proven to be 
optimal in the previous case) worsens the spread. It turns out that it still remains 
optimal to delay current investments in the presence of an epidemic spread; 
however the presence of this negative externality shortens the optimal delay of 
the previous case. The intuition is similar to the previous cost-benefit analysis, 
the only difference is that the benefits of current investments are now increased 
because they slow down the spread. The soundness of this new cost-benefit 
analysis still and nevertheless depends on the accuracy of the estimator of the 
time of vaccine appearance, and as argued earlier delays to sharpen this 
estimator still remain optimal. Following this reasoning, it is also easy to see 
that the stronger the externality of the spread, the shorter the delay. 
 
The optimal reaction of developing countries is rather problematic because it 
forces to delay current investments when we would ideally like immediate 
intervention. This is a typical situation of an uninsurable risk; in the next section, 
we show that the creation of financial products allowing to hedge against the 
risk of a vaccine appearance before a given date optimally tackles this problem. 
 
4. Risk management 
 
We now analyze how to optimally manage the risk of vaccine appearance 
from the viewpoint of developing countries.  In particular, we explain why 
optimal delays are shortened and the provision of AIDS-related expenditures is 
increased with the availability of insurance schemes. We also argue that 
standard insurance contracts cannot be used in this case. However, the design of 
such insurance schemes is postponed until the next section. 
 
The most obvious motivation for purchasing an insurance against a vaccine 
appearance before a given date is to compensate for the loss of sunk costs. The 
financial compensation allows future insurance payments to be allocated to the 
implementation of the new technology. That is, sunk costs are not recovered per 
se but the compensation to developing countries makes more funds available 
during the transition to the new technology. This lagging effect on investment 
compensations, and consequently crowding-out effects on current public 
expenditures, is unavoidable; however, future insurance payments have a direct 
and positive influence on current investment decisions at every macro-economic 
level.  
 
Leoni and Luchini (2006) carries out a welfare analysis to identify the effects 
of the availability of this insurance opportunity not only on AIDS spendings but 
also on other macro-economic variables such as public goods (like roads, 
schools et.c.). The point is to see whether the introduction of this insurance 
fosters investments in current treatment technologies as well as reduces the 
crowding-out effect on public expenditure described earlier.  The main finding is 
that the optimal reaction from developing countries, when having this insurance 
available, is to increase the level of investments in current treatment 
technologies. Moreover, it is shown that the optimal redistribution of insurance 
payments in case of a vaccine appearance also increases other current public 
expenditures. The study thus shows that crowding-out effects of AIDS 
spendings are significantly reduced when insurance schemes are available.  
 
The intuition of the results in Leoni and Luchini (2006) is well beyond the 
scope of this study, but the idea can be roughly summarized as follows. The 
introduction of this hedging tool completes the market; that is, it allows to 
switch from a situation of fully uninsurable risk to another one where every 
hedging need can be met. Standard economic theory teaches us that social 
welfare, which encompasses provision of public goods as well as AIDS 
spendings, is maximised when markets are complete. This increase in social 
welfare directly stems in our case from an increase in both the provision of 
AIDS spendings and public goods; the proportion of the increases and thus the 
reduction of crowding-out effects depend on the substitution effects across those 
goods.    
 
Another effect of the introduction of this insurance is the reduction of the 
optimal delay in current investments. Going back to our cost-benefit analysis 
from the previous section, we have seen that the optimal decision to invest in 
current treatment technologies occurs when the benefits of current investments 
are greater than their overall social costs. Those social costs must include the 
opportunity cost of unrecoverable funds in current investments. The necessity to 
consider those opportunity costs as social costs is that unrecoverable funds are 
invested in AIDS-related expenditures and not in other necessary public goods; 
this diversion of funds is economically detrimental because of the scarcity of 
resources (this issue is particularly stringent in developing countries). The value 
is what is currently forfeited, and permanently lost if no compensation is made, 
has a direct decreasing effect on overall social welfare encompassing every 
aspect of the social life of a country. 
 
One of the consequences of the welfare analysis in Leoni and Luchini (2006), 
described above, is that the opportunity cost of sunk costs can be partially 
compensated by the benefits of future insurance payments in case of an 
upgrading. The introduction of our insurance schemes therefore reduces the 
overall social cost of current investments in available technologies, since 
provision of public goods is shown to increase in this case. The optimal delay to 
evaluate whether the benefits of current investments are profitable enough is 
necessarily shortened as a consequence, by argument similar to the cost-benefit 
analysis of the previous section. However, since the uncertainty about the time 
of the vaccine appearance can only be reduced by delaying the investment, 
delaying still remains optimal. The following figure illustrates this situation. 
 Figure 3. Optimal investment delay with insurance 
 
After having described the benefits of this hypothetical insurance scheme, 
we are now left with designing its implementation. It turns out that standard 
insurance contracts are not applicable in this setting, for reasons explained next, 
and we must rely on recent financial products such as derivatives and in 
particular exotic options to meet this hedging need (see Hull, 2006, for a 
complete introduction to those products).  
 
There are many reasons why standard insurance contracts, like an 
individual car insurance contract, would be of no help in the fight against AIDS. 
Let us focus on car insurances to illustrate this idea, and let us take the 
standpoint of the insurer. Let us assume that this insurer knows somehow that 
her average customer has a car accident with a probability of, say, 10%, and that 
an accident triggers an average payment of $5,000 from the insurer. A naïve and 
inefficient way to manage this risk for the insurer would be to set an insurance 
premium so that she would break even ex-ante; here, the premium P to be 
charged should be such that P-5,000*0.1=0 corresponding to the fair price of the 
contract.  
 
The way this risk is managed in practice is very different from that, and it 
relies on more sophisticated statistical ideas. The problem of issuing one 
contract only is that the insurer faces a huge volatility on her cash flow, and 
therefore the issued contract would simply come down to transferring the risk of 
a car accident from the driver to her. Standard risk management techniques rely 
on the fact that this volatility is significantly reduced by issuing a large number 
of similar contracts; the idea is that the realised uncertainty of a large group of 
comparable individuals is a lot more predictable that the realised uncertainty of a 
single individual. The Central Limit Theorem for instance, when applied in this 
setting, asserts that percentage of the insured population that will actually have 
a car accident converges to 10% (this corresponds to the probability of an 
accident) as the insured population increases. With this fact in mind, it becomes 
straightforward for the insurer to manage the cash flow and the risk of accident. 
 
From the previous example, we can readily see why such contracts are of 
no use to hedge against a vaccine appearance. A potential insurer cannot issue 
many such contracts in the case of vaccine appearance, and all the customers are 
simultaneously affected by the same event (in contrast, it is fair to assume that 
the occurrence of an accident for a single driver cannot affect the odds of 
accident of a large population). As argued earlier, the insurance contract 
described in this section would thus represent a net risk transfer to the issuer, 
and this issuer would find it nearly impossible to diversify away this risk.  In the 
unlikely event that an insurer accepts to issue such a contract, any financial 
regulator following the Basel II agreement would prevent its issuance because of 
too high the risk taken by the insurer. It turns out that modern financial products 
such as derivatives and exotic options allow to replicate the desired hedge 
against a vaccine appearance while avoiding all the previous flaws. Those 
products are described in the next section. 
 
5. Health derivatives 
 
We now describe some financial products capable of replicating the desired 
hedge against the risk of upgrading before a given date, while avoiding the 
pitfalls of standard insurance contracts. As we have seen in the previous section, 
the main problem with standard insurance contracts is that the risk of vaccine 
appearance is nearly impossible to diversify away. We next describe two ‘exotic 
options’ making this diversification natural, even if they rely on two very 
different approaches of risk management. We first give a brief overview of these 
products, and we describe them in details later in this section. 
 
The first exotic option that we give is inspired from a class of credit 
derivatives (see Hull, 2006, Ch. 21 and Chacko, 2006) called Collaterized Debt 
Obligation, or CDO forthwith. Diversification is obtained by pooling parts of a 
broad insurance against vaccine appearance with many other risky assets in 
order to form a new financial asset. The point of adding parts only of the broad 
insurance against vaccine appearance, instead of the broad contract, is to allow 
an easier diversification through many CDOs. Once this large structured product 
is formed, the insurer or issuer of the CDO sells separate pieces or tranches of 
this body to investors, each tranche does not specify which assets are at risk but 
rather the overall risk of potential losses of the structured product. This 
construction is called a CDO, or also a structured product, even if they may take 
different shapes in practice. CDOs have largely grown in popularities to become 
one of the largest financial markets nowadays. To illustrate their importance, the 
aggregate global CDO issuance worldwide was U.S.$ 249 billion in 2005 and 
U.S.$ 489 billion in 2006.2 Finance professionals have found ways to 
incorporate various forms of financial assets into those structured products. For 
instance, the risk of default on individual home loans has been hedged with 
CDOs, even if they have caused the famous credit crunch of 2007 in the U.S. 
  
The second exotic option presented here is taken from Leoni and Luchini 
(2006). The way to diversify the risk of vaccine appearance in this case is based 
on the observation that developing countries and bodies in charge of the vaccine 
R&D face negatively correlated risks; that is, success in developing a vaccine 
negatively affects developing countries whereas failure maintains current 
investments in place longer and thus it positively affects those countries. In this 
situation, it should be possible to exchange the risk between those two parties by 
issuing well-designed securities, and it turns out that the securities described 
later achieve full risk-sharing between developing countries and agencies in 
charge of vaccine R&D. 
 
The financial products introduced here are regarded as the latest generation 
of financial products due to the originality in their diversification techniques. 
Structured products have been developed sometimes in the mid-90s to hedge 
against losses on corporate bonds in case of bankruptcy of the issuing sides. The 
securities described in Leoni and Luchini (2006) are more difficult to trace in 
practice because of some potential problems of moral hazard; in the case of a 
vaccine development it is possible to fully eliminate this problem as explained 
later. The origin of those securities is more theoretical and is due to K. Arrow 
and his early works on complete markets, thus the name of Arrow securities 
used throughout. Exotic options such as CAT bonds, introduced in the late 90s 
to provide compensations if a pre-determined catastrophic event occurs (or not), 
are somewhat similar to the Arrow securities designed here.  
 
One can easily imagine other ways to generate the desired hedge while 
avoiding diversification problems; however the central problem of pricing those 
products is a significant challenge that is not yet fully understood, and it thus 
can prevent their implementation.  
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 In contrast, the Gross Domestic Product of Benin in 2006 was U.S.$ 4,749 million. 
5.1 Structured product 
 
We now describe in details the first class of exotic options generating the 
desired hedge. The structured product presented next is derived from a standard 
CDO in which we can easily diversify any insurance contract against a vaccine 
appearance. Before showing how to diversify away our desired hedge with such 
a product, we first describe the basic organisation of an abstract CDO.  
 
Consider an arbitrary number of tradable assets, every asset has a reselling 
price and carries the risk that its price may decrease in the future. The point is to 
hedge against the risk of loss in the reselling value. Those assets can be 
assembled into one single financial product, whose value (or price) is the sum of 
the prices of all pooled assets. This structured product is also risky, since a loss 
on any constituting asset will directly translate into a loss on the pool. However, 
standard results in Probability Theory show that the variance of the structured 
product is smaller than the sum of all individual variances, and thus the 
structured product is less risky than individual assets alone. It turns out that the 
smaller the correlation across constituting assets, the less risky the structured 
product. 
 
The most standard way to diversify away the risk of the structured product is 
to cut it into pieces or tranches and to sell the tranches to outside investors, who 
would accept the risk of losses in return for a pre-agreed yield depending on the 
risk of the tranche. Tranches can be designed as follows, even if other 
combinations are possible and commonly seen. The first tranche amounts to, 
say, 15% of the overall initial value of the CDO and it absorbs the first 15% 
losses of this initial value. That is, if the CDO has lost more than 15% of its 
initial value during the lifetime of the tranche then the first tranche will become 
worthless. If now the overall loss on the CDO is less than 15% at the end of the 
lifetime, then the owner of the tranche will receive from the issuer of the CDO a 
pre-determined yield on the remaining value of the tranche on top of the 
remaining value. The second tranche amounts to 25% of the value of the CDO, 
and it absorbs losses within the range of 15-25% of the overall CDO during its 
lifetime. Payments to the owner of the second tranche work exactly as for the 
first tranche, with a different pre-determined yield though. The third tranche 
then absorbs losses within the range 25-35%, and works exactly as the previous 
ones. The process is repeated until every possible risk level is allocated to a 
tranche.  
 
The next question is how to attract outside investors in buying such tranches. 
Clearly, the first tranche is much riskier than the second tranche; the second 
tranche is much riskier than the third and so on. Therefore, the issuer must 
provide a greater yield to the owner of the first tranche to compensate for the 
greater risk, then a lower yield for the owner of the second tranche and so on. 
Typically, high yields on the riskiest tranches have attracted aggressive investors 
such as hedge funds, whereas less risky tranches have attracted conservative 
investors seeking assets with low risk and yields greater than those of riskless 
Treasury bonds for instance. The structure of this CDO is described in the 
following figure. 
 
Figure 4. Basic structure of a Collaterized Debt Obligation 
 
We now describe how to add the hedge against vaccine appearance into an 
abstract CDO as above. Consider a contract stipulating a pre-determined 
payment if a therapeutic vaccine becomes available before a given date and 
nothing otherwise; such payment need not cover all the losses incurred by 
developing countries so as to break down in smaller pieces the broad hedging 
scheme. The risk of loss in issuing this contract occurs in case of a vaccine 
appearance during the life of the contract, and in this case the loss to the issuer is 
the value of payment to developing countries less the selling price of the 
insurance. The only potential problem in adding this contract to an already 
existing CDO is that it would make the tranches riskier. That is, the potential 
pitfall is that the probability that any tranche becomes less profitable or even 
worthless increases by adding insurance schemes against the risk of a vaccine 
appearance. It turns out that the overall risk of having any tranche riskier is 
unaffected by adding this insurance contract to the CDO. This can be shown by 
observing that the risk of vaccine appearance is uncorrelated with the risk of 
losses of any other already-pooled asset, since the event of a vaccine appearance 
(or not) is independent of the performances of most of the financial assets traded 
such as stocks and corporate bonds. Even if the variance of the CDO will be 
affected, the overall risk of the structured product remains the same after adding 
this new insurance contract, and the attractiveness of the CDO also remains 
unchanged.   
 
We have thus seen that breaking down the large insurance contract against 
vaccine appearance and adding the smaller contracts to many CDOs is a natural 
and effective way to diversify away the risk. The inherent difficulty with this 
method is to find the optimal yield assigned to every class; this problem is 
however common to every CDO. Theoretical methods to find those yields are 
still in their infancy (see Hull, 2006, Ch. 21), despite the large volume of trades 
of those products. However, there exists a market price, instead of a theoretical 
price, for similar tranches characterized by their risk level. In practice, every 
tranche is assigned a risk level or credit rating by specialized agencies such as 
Moody’s. Once the credit rating of a given tranche is assigned, market indices 
such as iTraxx and CDX IG NA provide the current market price of the tranche. 
Since adding the insurance contract on AIDS to any CDO does not change the 
risk of the tranche, the pricing of the CDO is standard and thus this method of 
diversification can be regarded as feasible and efficient.  
 
5.2 Arrow securities 
 
We now describe our second class of financial products generating the 
desired hedge against the vaccine appearance. The approach to diversify away 
the risk here is significantly different from CDOs and other structured products; 
the idea is now to design securities allowing to share the risk of vaccine 
appearance/failure before a given date between bodies in charge of the vaccine 
R&D and developing countries. What follows is derived from Leoni and Luchini 
(2006); interested readers are referred to this reference for more details, in 
particular for the pricing of those securities. 
 
In our setting, we are dealing with two parties facing negatively correlated 
risk as explained earlier. On the one hand, developing countries face the risk of a 
loss of at least $6 billion in case of a vaccine appearance, and on the other hand 
vaccine development agencies have invested $500-600 million until 2006 in the 
R&D and they face the risk of loosing a significant part of this investment in 
case of failure (Leoni and Luchini, 2006, documents those losses). Many studies 
such as Arrow (71) show that it is never optimal for risk-averse agents to fully 
insure against all possible losses; however, it always remains optimal for risk-
averse agents to insure against a significant part of those losses. The point is 
now to design a set of securities allowing both parties to share the risk, by 
exploiting the negative correlation of the events triggering losses. 
  
Consider a financial asset available when decisions to invest in current 
treatment technologies are made, with a fixed maturity (or expiration) date and 
the following payoff structure: a pre-determined small payment is made to the 
owner of the asset if a successful vaccine is released before maturity and no 
payment is made otherwise. We call this asset an Arrow security. Developing 
countries can purchase this asset to hedge against the risk of vaccine appearance, 
and the small payment makes the diversification easier for the issuer.  
 
The way to achieve risk-sharing is obtained by issuing another security, 
which will call a complementary security. Consider a security similar to an 
Arrow security, different only in the payoff structure: the same payment is made 
to the owner if the vaccine is not released before maturity and no payment is 
made otherwise. Agencies in charge of the vaccine R&D are in demand for this 
complementary security, since they can compensate this way for losses resulting 
from failure in development. However, one must be very carefully when issuing 
complementary securities because the event triggering their payment is 
controllable by the party owning those securities.  Indeed, a simple way to make 
profits for those agencies is to purchase those securities in large amount, and to 
collude for not making any R&D at all. No vaccine will ever appear before 
maturity, and payments will be received in return for no effort. 
 
We must therefore refine our notion of complementary security to remove 
this moral hazard. The last problem can be simply tackled in the case of medical 
innovations as follows. The first observation is that every medical innovation 
must pass an official trial (for instance, the F.D.A. is in charge of organising 
those trials in the U.S.) before being approved and then released. A therapeutic 
vaccine against AIDS is no exception, and moreover there exist reliable tests 
capable of deciding whether a typically costly trial is worth undertaking (see 
Leoni and Luchini, 2006, and Klausner et al., 2003, for more details). We can 
therefore remove the moral hazard described above by making payment of the 
complementary security contingent on two events: 1- at least one therapeutic 
vaccine has passed the pre-trial test before maturity, and 2- no therapeutic 
vaccine is released before maturity. Condition 1 ensures that enough 
investments in R&D have been made by at least one development agency to 
have a reliable vaccine; the remaining uncertainty about the official approval 
depends on the F.D.A. for instance and it is beyond the agency control.  
 
There is yet another moral hazard linked to the nature of the trial. Indeed, 
medical trials are carried out by national agencies but are paid for by submitting 
companies. The typical cost of a trial amounts to 1/3 of the overall R&D budget. 
A natural strategy for a vaccine agency is thus to buy a large amount of 
complementary securities, to make enough R&D investments to pass the pre-
trial test and to immediately withdraw from the trial. A vaccine agency using 
this strategy can save 1/3 of its initial budget and receive the payment from the 
complementary securities, thus making a substantial profit. This moral hazard 
can simply be removed by adding a third clause to the contract stating that, in 
order to receive payment from complementary securities, no medical trial can be 
stopped without the approval of the official agency in charge of carrying it out. 
 
With those two securities, it is relatively easy to see that the risk of 
vaccine appearance and development failure can entirely be removed. Consider 
the viewpoint of an insurer having issued an insurance contract against vaccine 
appearance to a developing country. This contract can be entirely replicated by 
issuing a given number N of Arrow securities (the number needed to be issued 
depends on the amount of money payable on each security). A natural way to 
diversify away the risk incurred after this issuance is to issue exactly N 
complementary securities, in which the insurer is taking no risk at all and can 
make some profits through commission fees. This situation is described in the 
following figure. 
 
Figure 5. Risk-sharing between parties 
The last point to observe in the previous construction is that the risk of 
vaccine appearance has not fully been eliminated. Given the relative amounts of 
money needed to be insured by both parties, it appears that insurers following a 
N-for-N issuance scheme above cannot fully insure developing countries (recall 
that at least $6 billion are at risk in developing countries, whereas in contrast 
$500-600 million have been invested in vaccine R&D until 2006). The excess 
risk in developing can be optimally covered by international bodies, such as 
the GAFTAM, the G7 and else, subsidizing those countries in their fight against 
AIDS. Indeed, subsidies are entirely devoted to current treatments whereas 
throughout this study we have shown that this policy is inefficient. Diverting 
part of those subsidies to hedging against the pitfalls of a vaccine appearance 
would render those policies more efficient, and this would allow for a complete 
risk-sharing between parties involved in the therapeutic vaccine. Moreover, a 
combination of securities issuance and structured products (as in Section 5.1) to 
diversify away the resulting excess risk on developing countries is feasible, 




We have analysed, from the viewpoint of developing countries, the economic 
consequences of upgrading to innovative treatment technologies in the case of 
HIV/AIDS, with a particular focus on therapeutic vaccines. The basic risk for 
developing countries is that the future albeit uncertainty appearance of a 
therapeutic vaccine, or any other innovative treatment technology, would trigger 
significant losses in investments on current treatment technologies.  
 
In a first step, we have seen that the optimal reaction of a developing country, 
when facing the uncertainty about the time of availability of a vaccine 
appearance, is to delay investments in current treatment technologies despite the 
negative externalities this brings.  This finding is consistent with reports of 
reluctance to invest in current treatment technologies in some African countries 
(see UNAIDS, 2004, p.11). We have also seen that the availability of an 
insurance allowing to hedge against this risk significantly shortens the optimal 
delay in current investments, and other studies such as Leoni and Luchini (2006) 
show that the optimal investment level is increased with the availability of such 
an insurance scheme. However, standard insurance contracts are useless in this 
situation and we must rely on modern financial products to effectively replicate 
the desired hedge. 
 
In a second step, we have given two ways to replicate the desired hedge, one 
using structured products to diversify away the risk, the second one based on the 
issuance of Arrow securities allowing to achieve full risk-sharing with vaccine 
development agencies. We can imagine other financial products for this purpose; 
however their pricing always remains an important concern and a severe 
impediment to their practical implementation.  
 
This work has thus addressed the important problem of upgrading to 
innovative treatment technologies, an issue systematically ignored in the design 
of economic policies to fight HIV/AIDS. We argue that every optimal policy to 
fight this epidemic must go beyond the optimal funding of treatments with 
current technologies and the R&D in innovative medical products; it must also 
encompass the transition to those future albeit uncertain innovative technologies.  
 
In this respect, we recommend that funds allocation to current treatment 
technologies and/or R&D in innovative treatment technologies be accompanied 
with the issuance of financial products as described here. The point is that, when 
providing decision-makers with such hedging schemes, the present and future 
welfare gains largely offset the diversion of funds to immediate treatments and 
R&D. Those insurance products are thus a full component of every optimal 
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